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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Brandon Eddins asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of the Idaho 
Court of Appeals, 2014 Opinion NO.9 (Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2014) (hereinafter, Opinion). 
He submits that the Opinion, which affirmed his Judgment of Conviction and the order 
for restitution, is in conflict with previous decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court, as well 
as the Court of Appeals. As to the question of restitution, the dissent properly points out 
that the evidence presented in this case was uniquely unclear as to whether Mr. Eddins 
was the actual cause of Daniel Hight's injuries (Mr. Hight lost his left eye as a result of 
1 
being splashed with acid during a confrontation with Eddins), the jury 
acquitted him of aggravated battery and only convicted him of aggravated assault for 
threatening Mr. Hight with acid (though Mr. Hight he did not hear the threat). 
As such, Mr. Eddins was found to be not guilty of willfully causing the acid to contact 
Mr. Hight. As a result, the evidence does not show that Mr. Hight's injuries were caused 
by Mr. Eddins' culpable conduct. Therefore, the dissent properly points out, "we are 
bound by the framework of section 19-5304, as interpreted by the Idaho Supreme Court 
in Straub." (Opinion, p.14.) Under that framework, because this case requires 
application of civil rules in order to resolve the question of causation, restitution is 
inappropriate. The dissent also highlights the error in the majority's analysis: its 
decision was Uteh'vU on the majority's choice to speculate as to the causing the 
injury, which is inappropriate. In fact, the majority's speculation is not even a 
reasonable interpretation of the facts, given Mr. Hight's testimony. As such, the majority 
opinion is contrary to established precedent, and so, this Court should exercise its 
review authority in this case. 
As to the propriety of the judgment of conviction, the Court of Appeals 
unanimously found that the prosecutor made inappropriate statements that 
misrepresented the evidence to the jury - specifically, that Mr. Hight had lost his sense 
of sight despite the fact that the evidence demonstrated that he could still see out of 
one eye. However, it also unanimously found that error to be harmless because it 
concluded no reasonable juror would have been misled by that comment, and so the 
jurors' "potential sympathy toward blind people or against defendants who cause 
blindness would not be implicated." In so holding, the Court of Appeals improperly 
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focused on the actual effect of the statements on the jury, when precedent clearly 
that the focus is to be directed to prosecutor and her statements 
(specifically, whether the statements were "seemingly calculated" to get the 
jury to convict based on its emotions rather than the evidence presented). In this case, 
the prosecutor's statements were seemingly calculated to reach that result in this case, 
particularly given the fact that Mr. Hight's own testimony, that he did not hear the 
purported threat, significantly undermined the proof on one of the material elements of 
aggravated assault (well-founded fear). Therefore, since the Court of Appeals 
misapplied the for prejudice on this point, that constitutes a separate reason for this 
Court to grant review in this case. 
On this Court should vacate the judgment of conviction on the 
prosecutor's misconduct, which constitutes fundamental error. Alternatively, it should 
vacate the erroneous restitution award because Mr. Eddins' culpable conduct was not 
the actual cause of Mr. Hight's injuries. 
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
When Daniel Hight and Monique Lewis drove toward Ms. Lewis's grandparents' 
house at ten o'clock in the evening, they saw Mr. Eddins. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.18, L.20 - p.20, 
L.6; Tr., Vol. 1 , p.50, Ls.3-6; Tr., Vol. 1 , p.57, Ls.20-23.}1 Mr. Eddins was talking with 
1 The transcripts in this case were provided in several separate electronic PDF 
documents. To promote clarity, "Vol. 1 " will refer to the transcripts in the file "Eddins 
Reporter's Transcript - Towler" which contains the majority of the transcripts from the 
jury trial. "VoI.2" will refer to the transcripts in the file "Eddins Reporter's Transcript -
Towler II" which contains transcripts from the September 29, 2011, pretrial hearing, 
excerpts from the jury trial Uury instructions, counsels' opening and closing statements). 
"VoI.3" will refer to the transcripts in the file "Eddins Reporter's Transcript - Carlton" 
which contains the sentencing hearing. 
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Ms. Lewis's uncle in a field across the street from the grandparents' house. err., Vol. 1 , 
p.168, L23 ~ p.169, L 1.) Mr. Hight admitted, "I just wanted to get out and confront him 
about [an issue between them].,,2 (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.21, Ls.21-22.) However, he and Ms. 
Lewis decided to drive around the block, rather than stopping at the grandparents' 
house or retuming to Mr. Hight's house. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.21, L 11; Tr., Vol. 1 , p.51, 
Ls.2-18.) Mr. Eddins, meanwhile, had begun heading down an alleyway toward his 
house (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.169, Ls.23-24), and reached the other end as Mr. Hight and 
Ms. Lewis drove by. (See Tr., Vol. 1 , p.21, Ls.10-13; Tr., Vol. 1 , p.51, Ls.11-14; 
Tr., Vol. 1 , p.170, Ls.9-12.) 
Mr. Hight exited his vehicle and confronted Mr. Eddins. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.170, 
Ls.16-20; Tr., Vol 1, p.21, Ls.24-25.) Mr. Eddins admitted he told Mr. Hight, "back off, 
man, I have acid.,,3 (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.171, Ls.6-7.) Mr. Hight, however, testified that he 
could not remember Mr. Eddins saying any such thing. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.39, Ls.7-16.) Nor 
did Mr. Hight remember seeing the bottle that Mr. Eddins was carrying until the 
encounter was over. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.39, Ls.22-24.) Mr. Hight and Mr. Eddins disagreed 
over who started the confrontation and what occurred during that encounter. (Compare, 
Tr., Vol. 1 , p.171, Ls.1-24, with Tr., Vol. 1 , p.22, L23 - p.24, L2.) Ms. Lewis was in the 
car throughout the encounter.4 (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.52, Ls.23-25.) During that encounter, the 
2 Mr. Eddins claimed that he had paid Mr. Hight for an air conditioner and a camera, 
which Mr. Hight had failed to deliver to him. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.167, Ls.20 - p.167, L12.) 
3 The bottle recovered from the scene was determined to have acid in it. (Tr., Vol. 1 , 
p.130, Ls.11-20.) Mr. Hight claimed to be able to recognize that generic, unmarked, 
white, plastic bottle (see, e.g., State's Exhibits 4 and 5), as one belonging to Mr. Eddins. 
iSeeTr., Vol. 1 , p.25, Ls.1-B.) 
The car was facing away from the encounter and there were no street lights to 
illuminate the confrontation. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.172, Ls.16-20.) The confrontation occurred 
some feet behind the car. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.172, LS.13-15 (Mr. Eddins testifying it was ten 
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liquid in Mr. Eddins' bottle was released got on both Mr. Eddins and Mr. Hight. 
(Tr., Vol. 1 , p.24, Ls.9-22; Tr., Vol. 1 , p.172, Mr. Eddins was able to successfully 
perform first aid on himself, preventing significant damage to himself from the acid, 
although he was not able to open his eyes until the next day. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.155, 
L.2 p.156, L.i0; Tr., Vol. 1 , p.173, Ls.8-i6; Tr., Vol. 1 , p.i77, L.6 - p.i78, L.8.) 
Mr. Hight was not so fortunate. His initial efforts at first aid were unsuccessful. 
(See Tr., Vol. 1 , p.53, Ls.18-20.) He sought medical attention, and doctors continued to 
treat his eye. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.111, L.21 - p.1i2, L.17.) Despite their efforts, Mr. Hight lost 
his left eye. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.112, Ls.i8-22; Tr., Vol. 1 , p.121, Ls.20-25.) 
The State charged Mr. Eddins with aggravated battery by means of vitriol, acid, 
or other caustic chemical, with a persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.84-85.) At 
the subsequent trial, the jury was instructed on aggravated battery with acid, and, at the 
defense's request, the included offenses of aggravated assault with acid, simple battery, 
and simple assault. (R., pp.263-68.) The jury was instructed that it could only reach 
each subsequent included offense if it acquitted Mr. Eddins of the greater offense. 
(R., pp.265, 267-68.) During her statements to the jury, the prosecutor represented that 
Mr. Hight had "lost his sense of sight." (Tr., Vo1.2, p.119, L.i6; Tr., Vo1.2, p.148, L.25.) 
Mr. Hight, however, had testified that he was still able to see with his other eye. (See, 
e.g., Tr., Vol. 1 , p.28, L.17 (Mr. Hight testifying that he can still see, although he has had 
to adjust based on the impact to his depth perception).) The jury convicted Mr. Eddins 
of the included offense of aggravated assault, and also found the necessary prior 
convictions to support the alleged enhancement. (R., pp.249-51.) 
feet behind the car); Tr., Vol. 1 , p.62, Ls.1-2 (Ms. Lewis testifying it occurred two to three 
feet behind the car).) 
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The district court sentenced Mr. Eddins to a unified term of fifteen years, with six 
years fixed. (R., p.327~29.) The requested restitution in the amount of $5,241.79 
for Mr. Hight. (Tr., Vo1.3, p.35, LS.6-1 see Tr., Vo1.3, p.40, Ls.16-18.) Mr. Eddins 
challenged that request because the jury only convicted Mr. Eddins of threatening to 
use acid, but acquitted him of actually using acid to strike Mr. Hight. (Tr., Vo1.3, p.29, 
LsA-16.) Therefore, defense counsel argued, any damages relating to the touching of 
Mr. Hight with acid were not caused by Mr. Eddins' culpable conduct (threatening to 
use acid). (Tr., Vo1.3, p.28, L.i8 - p.29, L.i6.) The district court rejected that argument 
deciding it co,:!ld order the restitution because the losses "flow[ed] from the criminal 
conduct that Mr. Eddins was found guilty ot." (Tr., Vo1.3, p.40, L.23 - p.41, L.1.) 
Accordingly it entered an order of restitution for the amount requested. (R., p.339.) 
Mr. Eddins timely appealed from the judgment of conviction and restitution order. 
(R., pp.343-45.) 
Mr. Eddins raised two issues on appeal: (1) whether the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by misrepresenting or mischaracterizing the evidence in her closing 
argument, and (2) whether the district court improperly awarded restitution for damages 
not caused by Mr. Eddins' culpable conduct. As to the question of prosecutorial 
misconduct, the Court of Appeals unanimously concluded that the prosecutor had 
mischaracterized the evidence, but also concluded that the error was harmless. 
(Opinion, pp.6-7.) Specifically, it held: 
Because no reasonable juror would have concluded that Hight was 
completely blind, Eddins has not shown that the potentially misleading 
nature of the statements affected the outcome of the tria/. For similar 
reasons, we conclude that the jury's verdict was not the result of an 
appeal to emotions or passions. Because no reasonable juror could have 
been misled to believe that Hight had been blinded, the juror's potential 
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sympathy toward blind people or against defendants who cause blindness 
would not be implicated. Therefore, Eddins failed to show 
fundamental error. 
(Opinion, pp.6-7.) 
As to the question of restitution, the Court of Appeals held that verdict in this 
case did demonstrate that Mr. Eddins had only been convicted for the threat. (Opinion, 
pp.8, 11.) It also recognized that the evidence presented on what happened after that 
threat was issued was inconsistent, and that the jury appeared to disbelieve Mr. Hight's 
version of events. (Opinion, pp.8, 12-13.) However, a majority of the Court disregarded 
that disparity in the evidence presented and simply speculated that "the jury could have 
found that Hight responded to Eddins' threat by pushing Eddins, causing the bottle of 
acid to spill over both men." (Opinion, p.8.) As a result, the majority held that, because 
Mr. Eddins threatened Mr. Hight with acid, and Mr. Hight's supposed reaction was 
reasonable, given the supposed lack of alternatives available to him to avoid the harm, 
his injury was "reasonably foreseeable and proximately caused by Eddins' conduct." 
(Opinion, pp.9-10.) Based on that same rationale, the majority found that Mr. Eddins' 
criminal act of threatening Mr. Hight was also the actual cause of the injuries. (See 
Opinion, p.10.) As such, it affirmed the restitution order. (Opinion, p.1 0.) 
However, Chief Judge Gutierrez dissented on the question of restitution. His 
opinion reminds the majority that this Court has placed limitations on restitution 
proceedings - they are not to be used as substitutes for civil actions - and that 
restitution was inappropriate in this case because there were significant questions of 
causation and comparative fault resulting from the jury's specific verdict. (Opinion, 
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pp.10-11.) As such, the Chief Judge highlighted the major flaw in the majority's 
rationale: 
The majority hypothesizes that "the jury could have found that Hight 
responded to Eddins' threat by pushing Eddins, causing the bottle of acid 
to spill over both men." However the purpose of the statutory restitution 
process is to award those economic losses caused by the already 
adjudicated criminal act; the purpose is not to search for or speculate as to 
what caused the damage. 
(Opinion, p.13 (emphasis from original).) The Chief Judge also pointed out a critical 
difference between this case and the precedents upon which the majority relied: those 
cases did not involve questions of comparative fault. (Opinion, p.12.) As a result, since 
there was substantial uncertainty as to whose acts caused Mr. Hight's injuries, the Chief 
Judge concluded, under the framework established by statute and Court 
precedent, that this was a case where restitution was an inappropriate vehicle to resolve 
the questions about causation and liability for the damages claimed. (Opinion, p.14.) 
As such, the dissent would have vacated the restitution order. (Opinion, p.14.) 
Mr. Eddins filed a timely petition for review from the Court of Appeals' Opinion. 
8 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the majority's opinion affirming the restitution award is in conflict with 
previous decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, as the 
evidence does not support the majority's conclusion that Mr. Eddins' culpable 
conduct was the legal cause of Mr. Hight's injuries. 
2. Whether the Court of Appeals' Opinion affirming the judgment of conviction is in 
conflict with prior decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court and the Court of 
Appeals, as it misapplied the test for prejudice under the fundamental error test. 
3. Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct by misrepresenting or 
mischaracterizing the evidence in her closing argument. 
4. Whether the district court improperly awarded restitution for damages not caused 




The Majority's Opinion Affirming The Restitution Award Is In Conflict With Previous 
Decisions Of The Idaho Supreme Court And The Court Of Appeals, As The Evidence 
Does Not Support The Majority's Conclusion That Mr. Eddins' Culpable Conduct Was 
The Legal Cause Of Mr. Hight's Injuries 
A. Standard For Evaluating Petitions For Review 
The Idaho Appellate Rules provide that petitions for review may be 
granted "when there are special and important reasons" for doing so but, ultimately, the 
decision of whether to grant a given petition lies within the sound discretion of the 
Supreme Court. I.AR. 118(b). Rule 118(b) provides some factors which must be 
considered in evaluating any petition for review, including: 
1) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with precedent from 
Idaho Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court; [and] 
2) Whether the Court of Appeals' decision is inconsistent with its own prior 
decisions. 
I.A.R. 118(b). In this case, Mr. Eddins contends that there are special and important 
reasons for review to be granted. The Court of Appeals' analysis on both questions 
presented is in contravention of Idaho Supreme Court and Court of Appeals precedent, 
in regard to the proper interpretation of statutes. I.A.R. 118(b)(2)-(3). Therefore, this 
Court should exercise its review authority in this case. 
B. As The Dissent Properly Points Out, Where There Are Substantial Questions 
About Causation, Restitution Is An Inappropriate Mechanism To Resolve Those 
Outstanding Questions About Liability For The Claimed Damages 
As the dissent properly recognized, the Idaho Supreme Court has recently 
rejected the majority's rationale for affirming the restitution award - that, simply because 
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the damages were foreseeable, they are authorized by the restitution statute. (Opinion, 
p.14 (citing v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882,890 (2013)).) In Straub, this Court declared: 
"If we allow all foreseeable damages to be clothed in criminal restitution, we will draw to 
a standstill an already overburdened criminal court process. Prosecutors and criminal 
defense attorneys would then have to engage in civil discovery and trials of a civil 
nature on top of already complex criminal procedure and trials." Id. Therefore, this 
Court concluded that a restitution award, which was not consistent with the restitution 
statute, needed to be vacated. Id. The majority's opinion in this case at bar is contrary 
to that limitation on restitution, as it affirms the restitution order in this case simply 
because "the resulting injury was reasonably foreseeable and proximately by 
Eddins' conduct." (Opinion, pp.9-10.) Therefore, because the opinion in this case is 
inconsistent with this Court's precedent in Straub, this Court should grant review to 
correct that inconsistent conclusion. 
Additionally, the majority inappropriately based its opinion on its speculation that 
"the jury could have found that Hight responded to Eddins' threat by pushing Eddins, 
causing the bottle of acid to spill over both men." (Opinion, pp.8, 12.) It is difficult to 
see how this is a reasonable interpretation of the evidence, since Mr. Hight, himself, 
testified that he did not hear the threat. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.29, Ls.7-14.) One does not 
"respond to raj threat" that one does not hear. Thus, the facts, given the jury's specific 
verdict in this case, actually demonstrate that Mr. Hight was the initial aggressor in the 
physical confrontation, and thus, it was his actions, and not Mr. Eddins' threat, which 
caused the acid to be propelled from its bottle. Because the majority based its decision 
to affirm the restitution order on its unreasonable speculation regarding the facts, that 
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error demonstrates that the whole of the majority's rationales are unreasonable, and 
thus, further why this Court should grant in this case. 
Furthermore, the majority's opinion was on erroneous comparisons with 
this Court's decision in State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 606 (2011), and the Court of 
Appeals' decision State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387, 390 (Ct. App. 2012). (Opinion, p.9.) 
As the dissent points out, there is a critical factual question that is presented in this case 
that was not present in either of those cases: 
One of the significant distinctions is that this case was tried before a jury 
and the jury trial resulted in an acquittal of the aggravated battery charge; 
both Cottrell and Corbus involved guilty pleas. In both Cottrell and 
Corbus, the underlying cause of the economic loss was apparent and the 
facts as to the cause were undisputed. In Eddins' the parties have 
conflicting testimony, recalling different versions of the incident that 
resulted in Hight incurring acid burns. Thus, this case has open questions 
relating to actual cause and proximate cause. Moreover, this case raises 
the issue of comparative fault or a similar concept that was not present in 
either Cottrell or Corbus.[5] 
(Opinion, pp.11-12.) Because of these open questions of fact, the dissent concluded 
that a civil proceeding, and not a restitution hearing, was the proper forum to resolve the 
question of liability for Mr. Hight's injuries, since these questions of fact could be fully 
5 The question of whether application of a comparative fault concept in terms of whether 
restitution should be awarded is a question of substance not yet fully addressed by this 
Court. In Straub, this Court reviewed the amount of an award of restitution, and held 
that applying additional civil rules to allow for the calculation and award of speculative 
future damages was inappropriate. Straub, 153 Idaho at 890. However, that conclusion 
(finding civil rules in the calculation of the appropriate total award) does not fully answer 
the question of whether the district courts need to apply additional civil rules to 
determine whether restitution is appropriate at all. Compare Straub, 153 Idaho at 890 
with Lampien, 148 Idaho at 374 (applying civil rules of causation in determining whether 
restitution is appropriate). Therefore, either the majority's opinion (which would provide 
that such analysis in irrelevant to restitution) decides a substantive question of law not 
yet addressed by this Court, or fails to consider that necessary analysis regarding 
causation. In either case, this is another reason this Court should grant review in this 
case. 
12 
litigated in the civil forum.6 (Opinion, p.1 ) to the ultimate question raised on 
appeal whether restitution award in this case was proper under the statute the 
dissent properly concluded that, without clear facts establishing causation, either actual 
or proximate, between Mr. Eddins' culpable action and Mr. Hight's injuries received, the 
restitution award was inappropriate in this case. (See Opinion, pp.10-14.) 
To that point, the majority's comparisons to Corbus and Cottrell are misplaced. 
For example, the majority asserts that this case is similar to Corbus, "'especially given 
the lack of alternatives available.'" (Opinion, pp.9-10 (quoting Corbus, 150 Idaho at 
606).) The critical question in Corbus related to proximate cause, whether the victim's 
injuries were foreseeable consequences of the defendant's culpable conduct. This 
Court concluded that they were, and that, "[t]his is especially true given that jumping 
from the vehicle was the only means available to passenger to escape the 
dangerous situation." Corbus, 150 Idaho at 605 (emphasis added). However, unlike the 
victim in Corbus, Mr. Hight had two distinct means by which to escape the dangerous 
situation besides attacking Mr. Eddins: (1) Mr. Hight, who was, by his own admission, 
seeking to confront Mr. Eddins, could have driven home rather than try and confront 
Mr. Eddins in the first place (see Tr., Vo/'1, p.21, Ls.21-22 (wanting to confront 
Mr. Eddins); Tr., Vol. 1 , p.21, L.11 (Mr. Hight testifying they chose to drive around the 
block); Tr., Vo/'1, p.51, Ls.2-18 (Ms. Lewis testifying that she thought they were going to 
drive back to Mr. Hight's house, but stopped when they saw Mr. Eddins)); and 
6 This position is consistent with the Court of Appeals' subsequent decision in 
State v. Torrez, _ P.3d _, 2014 WL 902858 (Ct. App. 2014), where the Court of 
Appeals held that the district court did not err in failing to apply the civil rule of 
comparative negligence in its assessment of the appropriate amount of restitution, given 
the rule from Straub. Torrez, 2014 WL 902858, pp.5-6. 
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(2) Mr. Hight had the option to get in his car and drive away after Mr. Eddins issued the 
threat, rather than in a physical confrontation Tr., Vol. 1 , 
p.171, LS.6-7 (emphasis added).) Therefore, as the dissent points out, the majority's 
reliance on Corbus is misplaced. (See Opinion, p.13.) 
The majority's comparison to Corbus is also misplaced because Mr. Eddins is 
asserting that his threat was not the actual cause of Mr. Hight's injury (whether, but for 
Mr. Eddins' culpable conduct, the injuries would have occurred at all), as opposed to the 
proximate cause, which was the focus in Corbus. The two concepts are distinct from 
one another, and this Court has made it clear that, while damages may be foreseeable, 
that alone does not satisfy the causation requirement. Straub, 153 Idaho at 890 
(holding that just U\'''-Juu damages are is not dispositive on whether they 
are properly claimed through restitution); v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 374 (2007) 
(describing the two different analyses required to show actual and proximate cause). 
Therefore, since Corbus was not even analyzing the facts under the same test that is 
applicable to Mr. Eddins' claim of error, the majority's reliance on that decision is 
misplaced. 
In regard to the issue of actual cause, the majority points to Cottrell based on the 
idea that it was not the defendant's act itself, but the officer's response to that act, which 
resulted in the injury in question. (Opinion, p.g.) As such, based on the majority's 
7 Given Mr. Hight's testimony that he neither heard the threat nor saw the bottle, the 
evidence presented actually leads to the conclusion that Mr. Hight, not Mr. Eddins, was 
the initial aggressor in the physical confrontation. As a result, it would be Mr. Hight's 
actions that actually caused the acid to be expelled from the bottle. In that case, a 
restitution award against Mr. Eddins would be inappropriate, since his culpable conduct 
would not have caused the acid to get on Mr. Hight (hence the jury's verdict finding him 
not guilty of aggravated battery with acid). 
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erroneous hypothesis that Mr. Hight was reacting to Mr. Eddins' threat, the threat would 
be the actual cause of the injuries. (See Opinion, p.9.) dissent points out, a 
cause-and-effect relationship was sufficient in that case to establish a "but for" 
relationship between the culpable act and the injury: "We concluded that the actual 
cause was satisfied because evidence showed 'it was Cottrell's act of attempting to pull 
away from [the officer] during arrest that precipitated the need for [the officer] to gain 
control of Cottrell and, in so doing, twist his knee.'" (Opinion, p.12 (emphasis from 
original) (quoting Cottrell, 152 Idaho at 393).) However, as the dissent also points out, it 
is not at all clear in this case that, but for Mr. Eddins' threat, acid would have gotten in 
Mr. Hight's eye: "In contrast to Cottrell, when Eddins' criminal act was completed, the 
victim was still uninjured--Eddins' criminal of aggravated by threat was 
complete once the threat had been made .... what happened after Eddins made the 
threat is unclear." (Opinion, p.12.) The dissent went on to explain: 
The uncertainty as to what act caused the injury separates Eddins' case 
from Cottrell and Corbus. In Cottrell, it was undisputed that the officer 
injured his leg while regaining control over Cottrell during the commission 
of Cottrell's criminal act of obstruction. In Corbus, it was undisputed that 
the victim was injured as a result of jumping from the vehicle during 
Corbus' commission of his criminal acts of reckless driving and eluding a 
police officer. In this case, the jury presumably found that there was a 
threat, but there was some other event that occurred between the 
completion of the criminal act and the injury in this case. It has not been 
established what the other event is because of the jury's bifurcated verdict 
and the conflicting testimony from Eddins and Hight. 
(Opinion, p.13 (emphasis added).) To the dissent's point about the separation between 
the criminal conduct and the injuries, Mr. Eddins' threat could have been the only thing 
that passed between the two men, and both could have left the scene unscathed. In 
fact, that was the apparent purpose of the threat, to deesca/ate the confrontation and 
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a physical encounter. (See Tr., Vol. 1 , p.171, LS.6-7 (quoting Mr. Eddins as saying 
off, man, I have acid") (emphasis added).) Conversely, even if the threat had not 
issued, the injury could still have occurred if the parties immediately engaged in a 
physical confrontation. Therefore, unlike Cottrell, there is no clear "but for" connection 
between the threat and the injuries, since the injuries are not dependent on the threat 
being issued. 
This is where the Court of Appeals' previous analysis in State v. Shafer, 144 
Idaho 370 (Ct. App. 2007), becomes important. The majority disregarded Shafer on the 
grounds that the defendant's criminal act in that case occurred after the victim suffered 
her injuries, in this case, Mr. Eddins' criminal preceded the injuries. 
(Opinion, pp.8-9.) That is a distinction without consequence. The underlying rule in 
Shafer is that, a causal connection between the defendant's criminal act and the 
victim's injuries, restitution is not authorized under I.C. § 19-5301. Shafer, 144 Idaho at 
373 ("Shafer's criminal act of leaving the scene and failing to provide information and 
assistance did not cause the injuries and property damage suffered by the other 
driver."). That basic rule is applicable regardless of the order in which the events 
unfolded. The dissent's explanation demonstrates why there is no causal connection in 
this case, and hence, why the rule from Shafer is applicable: "In this case, the jury 
presumably found that there was a threat, but there was some other event that occurred 
between the completion of the criminal act and the injury in this case. It has not been 
established what the other event is because of the jury's bifurcated verdict and the 
conflicting testimony from Eddins and Hight." (Opinion, p.13 (emphasis added).) Since 
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the evidence of what happened after the threat was made is unclear,s it fails to show the 
"but for" relationship between the threat and the injury, thus, restitution in this case, 
as it was in Shafer, is inappropriate. Thus, the majority's opinion is in direct contrast to 
the rule established in Shafer, and so this Court should exercise its review authority in 
this case. 
As a result, the Court of Appeals' Opinion is inconsistent with this Court's 
precedent in Straub and Lampien, as well as its own precedent in Shafer. This Court 
should exercise its review authority in this case. 
II. 
The Court Of Appeals' Opinion Affirming The Judgment Of Conviction Is In Conflict With 
Prior Decisions Of The Idaho Supreme Court And The Court Of Appeals, As It 
Misapplied The Test For Prejudice Under The Fundamental Error Test 
Mr. Eddins also argued on appeal that the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
mischaracterizing the evidence in her closing arguments, appealing to the emotions and 
passions of the jury. Specifically, he pointed out that the prosecutor erroneously argued 
that Mr. Hight had "lost his sense of sight," despite clear evidence that Mr. Hight was 
still able to see. (See, e.g., Tr., Vo1.2, p.119, L.16 (example of the prosecutor's 
statement); Tr., Vo/'1, p.28, L.17 (Mr. Hight testifying that he can still see, although he 
has had to adapt to the change in his depth perception).) As there was no 
contemporaneous objection, Mr. Eddins argued that this misconduct constituted 
8 The State bears the burden of proof in restitution cases. See, e.g., State v. Nienburg, 
153 Idaho 491, 497-98 (Ct. App. 2012), reh'g denied; see also In re Doe, 146 Idaho 
277, 284-85 (Ct. App. 2008) (tracing that rule through several other Court of Appeals' 
decisions). Therefore, since the evidence does not prove causation, the State failed to 
meet its burden of proof, and thus, the Court of Appeals' Opinion affirming that 
restitution award is erroneous. As such, this Court should exercise its review authority 
in this case. 
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fundamental error. The Court of Appeals did find that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct by improperly mischaracterizing evidence in her closing statements. 
However, in the prejudice prong of the fundamental error analysis, it 
misapplied the relevant test, and so improperly concluded that Mr. Eddins had failed to 
show he was entitled to relief as a result of that misconduct. Because the Opinion 
misapplies the relevant test for prejudice, this Court should exercise its review authority 
on this issue as well. 
This Court has established the proper standard for evaluating the prejudice prong 
of the fundamental error analysis: "If the defendant meets this burden [to prove a clear 
violation of his constitutional rights] then an appellate court shall review the error under 
the harmless error test, with the defendant bearing the burden of proving there is a 
reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial." State v. Perry, 
150 Idaho 209,226 (2010) (emphasis added); see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 
18,22 (1967); State v. Day, 154 Idaho 476,479 (Ct. App. 2013). However, in this case, 
the Court of Appeals' found no prejudice because: 
[NJo reasonable juror would have concluded that Hight was completely 
blind, Eddins has not shown that the potentially misleading nature of the 
statements affected the outcome of the trial. For similar reasons, we 
conclude that the jury's verdict was not the result of an appeal to emotions 
or passions. Because no reasonable juror could have been misled to 
believe that Hight had been blinded, the juror's potential sympathy toward 
blind people or against defendants who cause blindness would not be 
implicated. 
(Opinion, pp.6-7 (emphasis added).) 
That conclusion improperly requires Mr. Eddins to show actual prejudice, rather 
than a reasonable possibility of prejudice because it improperly focuses the analysis on 
the jurors' reactions to the statements. The actual test, as this Court has clearly held, is 
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focused on the prosecutor and the statements themselves, and not whether the jury 
was actually prejudiced: "if the misconduct of the was calculated to inflame 
the minds of the jurors and arouse passion or prejudice against the defendant, or is so 
inflammatory that the jurors may be influenced to determine guilty on factors outside the 
evidence .... " See, e.g., State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 942 (1994); see also 
State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding that an appeal to emotions 
prejudices the defendant if it is "seemingly calculated to arouse negative emotions") 
(emphasis added); State v. Pecor, 132 Idaho 359,367 (Ct. App. 1998) (same). 
For example, the offending statement in Pecor was that the defendant was a 
"[drug] dealer to your sons and daughters." Pecor, 1 Idaho at 367. In Phillips, the 
Court of Appeals that comment as "subtle and indirect." Phillips, 144 Idaho at 
87. Despite its indirect nature, that comment was still seemingly calculated to inspire 
negative emotions toward the defendant. Pecor, 132 Idaho at 367. The defense did not 
have to prove that the juror's emotions were actually roused, nor did he have to prove 
that those negative emotions were associated with the defendant's alleged drug dealing 
or the idea of a stranger approaching the jurors' children with harmful intent. See 
generally id. In either case, the statement was prejudicial because the prosecutor made 
that statement in a way that was seemingly calculated to get the jurors to decide the 
case based on those negative emotions rather than the evidence presented during the 
trial. See id. The Court reached a similar conclusion in Phillips: the prosecutor's 
statement was seemingly calculated to get the jury feeling irritated by the defendant's 
testimony, and so those improper comments prejudiced the defendant. Phillips, 144 
Idaho at 87-89. The lack of such apparent intent was the reason this Court found the 
19 
inappropriate statements in Babb to be harmless, not the defendant had failed 
to prove that the jurors were actually prejudiced by the QT'~I'eolrT1 but "none 
of [the potentially improper statements] indicate an intent on the part of the prosecutor 
to inflame the minds the jurors or to arouse passion or prejudice against Babb, nor were 
they so inflammatory that the jurors might be influenced to determine guilt on factors 
outside the evidence." Babb, 125 Idaho at 942. 
In this case, the assertion that Mr. Hight had lost his sense of sight was 
seemingly calculated to arouse negative emotions in the jury. The appeal to emotions 
in this case is simply to get the jury thinking that, because Mr. Hight suffered severe 
injuries, it should convict Mr. Eddins, regardless of the that was actually 
presented. The prejudice by those statements is particularly evident, given 
fact that the jury actually convicted Mr. Eddins of the lesser~included offense of 
aggravated assault, even though Mr. Hight's own testimony disproved one of the 
elements of that offense. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol. 1 , p.29, Ls.7-14 (Mr. Hight testifying that 
he did not hear Mr. Eddins make any threat).) 
When a conviction is for assault by threat,9 the victim must have a well-founded 
fear arising from that threat. See State v. Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733,739 (Ct. App. 2003); 
9 The logical implication of the acquittal of aggravated battery is that the jury could have 
only convicted Mr. Eddins of aggravated assault under an assault by threat theory (see 
page 27, note 12, infra, describing the difference between assault by threat and assault 
by attempt). It would be illogical for the jurors to have acquitted Mr. Eddins for the act of 
physically touching Mr. Hight required for battery, yet convict him of the attempt to touch 
required by the alternate theory of assault when that attempt actually succeeded. If 
there were an attempt to unlawfully touch Mr. Hight, then the successful touch would be 
unlawful as well. However, the jury's verdict declares that the touch was not unlawful. 
Therefore, the only logical explanation for the verdict, which is presumed to not have 
been reached by compromise, convicted Mr. Eddins for the threat. The Court of 
Appeals agreed with this conclusion. (Opinion, p.8.) 
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State v. Rae, 139 Idaho 650, (Ct. App. 2004). That is difficult for the to prove 
when the victim under oath, that he did not actually hear the alleged threat. 
(Tr., Vol. 1 , p.39, Ls.7-16.) Mr. Hight did testify that he saw Mr. Eddins start swinging his 
arm toward him. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.40, Ls.5-6.) However, Mr. Hight testified that he only 
thought Mr. Eddins was trying to punch him; that he did not see the bottle containing the 
acid until after the fact. (Tr., Vol. 1 , p.24, Ls.9-10; Tr., Vol. 1 , p.39, Ls.22-24.) As such, 
the evidence that Mr. Hight had a well-founded fear from Mr. Eddins' apparent ability to 
carry out the threat to use acid is noticeably lacking in this case. Therefore, there is a 
reasonable possibility that the prosecutor's misrepresentation of the extent of 
Mr. Hight's injury caused the jury return a verdict of guilty for that offense based on 
their emotions for Mr. Hight's plight, than decide the solely on the evidence. 
Furthermore, the fact that the jury did acquit Mr. Eddins of the aggravated battery 
further demonstrates that the conviction in this case was based on factors beyond the 
evidence presented, since the jury obviously found the evidence in this case to be 
lacking. 
Thus, the prosecutor's improper statement, which was seemingly calculated to 
arouse the juror's passions and emotions, was prejudicial. As such, because the Court 
of Appeals misapplied the test in this regard, this Court should exercise its review 
authority in this case. 
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III. 
If Review Is Granted, This Court Should Find The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By 
Misrepresenting Or Mischaracterizing The Evidence In Her Closing Argument 
A. Introduction 
The prosecutor is not allowed to mischaracterize or misrepresent the evidence 
during her closing argument. She is also not allowed to appeal to the emotion, passion 
or prejudice of the jury. Doing so deprives the defendant of a fair trial and requires that 
the conviction be vacated and a new trial be ordered. Because the prosecutor engaged 
in such conduct during Mr. Eddins' trial, the error is clear from the record, and it 
prejudiced Mr. Eddins, this Court should find fundamental error and vacate Mr. Eddins' 
conviction and remand his case for a new trial. 
B. By Representing To The Jury That Mr. Hight Had "Lost His Sense Of Sight," The 
Prosecutor Misrepresented The Evidence And Improperly Appealed To The 
Jurors' Emotions; Mr. Hight Could Still See And Had Full Use Of His Right Eye 
Idaho's appellate courts have clearly held that an attorney "may not misrepresent 
or mischaracterize the evidence" during her closing arguments. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 
86; see also State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 165 (1980), abrogated on other grounds 
by State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 396 (1981). Those closing arguments also may not 
consist of "appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury .... " Phillips, 144 Idaho 
at 86. This rule is especially true for prosecutors because they: 
too often forget that they are part of the machinery of the court, and that 
they occupy an official position, which necessarily leads jurors to give 
more credence to their statements, action, and conduct in the course of 
the trial and in the presence of the jury than they will give counsel for the 
accused. It seems that they frequently exert their skill and ingenuity to 
see how far they can trespass upon the verge of error, and generally in 
doing so transgress upon the rights of the accused. It is the duty of the 
prosecutor to see that the defendant has a fair trial, and that nothing but 
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competent evidence is submitted to the jury, and above all things he 
should guard against anything that would prejudice the minds of the jurors, 
tend to hinder them from considering only the evidence introduced. 
Id. (quoting State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 43-44 (1903)). Therefore, the prosecutor 
fails in that responsibility, she deprives the defendant of a fair trial, tainting the 
subsequent conviction so that it cannot stand. See id.; Griffiths, 101 Idaho at 165. 
Where there is no contemporaneous objection to such misconduct, it will only be 
reviewed for fundamental error. Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. To show fundamental error, 
the appellant must demonstrate that: (1) the error violates one of his unwaived 
constitutional rights, (2) the error is clear from the record, and (3) the error prejudiced 
him. Id. at Defendants have a constitutional right to a fair trial and due process 
therein. U . CONST., amend. VI; U.S. CONST., amend. XIV. Prosecutorial misconduct 
in the closing argument can deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial. United 
States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 12 (1985); State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742,752-54 (1991), 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 432 (1991); Phillips, 144 
Idaho at 86. It is a long-standing rule that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process 
protections prevent the State from obtaining convictions when the prosecutor knowingly 
uses false evidence. Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967). The protection is not just 
against wholly-fabricated evidence, but extends to arguments which misstate the 
evidence brought out during the tria/. See, e.g., United States v. Fearns, 501 F.2d 486, 
488-89 (7th Cir. 1974). In Fearns, the Seventh Circuit ordered a retrial after the 
prosecutor had tried to bolster the credibility of one of the government's witness by 
telling the jury that he had made a prior consistent statement even though no evidence 
of such a statement had been offered at trial. Id. The Seventh Circuit admonished the 
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prosecutor, describing that behavior as a violation of a "fundamental rule, known to 
lawyer," which constituted "gross misconduct" Id. at 489. Such misconduct 
deprives the defendant of his due process rights. State v. Rozencrantz, 110 Idaho 
124, 131 (Ct. App. 1986). Rather, the prosecutor has "a duty to avoid misrepresentation 
of the facts." Griffiths, 101 Idaho at 166; see also State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 
769-70 (1993); Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86. 
In this case, as in Fearns, the prosecutor embellished a fact in argument to 
bolster her case: she told the jury that Mr. Hight had "lost his sense of sight." 
(Tr., VoL2., p.119, L16; Tr., Vo1.2, p.148, L25.) That statement is not true, as Mr. Hight 
testified that he maintained his sense of sight. 1o (See, e.g., Tr., Vol. 1 , p.28, L 17.) 
Given that the jury actually acquitted Mr. Eddins of the aggravated battery, the 
prosecutor's misstatement of the evidence is troubling, as the jurors may have fully 
acquitted Mr. Eddins (especially given the lack of evidence on the a well-founded fear 
element of aggravated assault) absent the prosecutor's inaccurate appeal to their 
emotions. Therefore, the error is fundamental and impacts at least one of Mr. Eddins' 
unwaived constitutional rights, satisfying first prong of the Perry test is met. Compare 
Fearns, 501 F.2d at 488-89. 
The error is also plain from the face of the record. The prosecutor told the jury 
that Mr. Hight had "lost his sense of sight." (Tr., VoI.2., p.119, L.16; Tr., Vo1.2, p.148, 
10 "Sight," in this context, is defined as "the sense of which the eye is the receptor and 
by which qualities of appearance (as position, shape, and color) are perceived. 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS, 746 (2007). Mr. Hight testified that, 
while the incident did impact his depth perception, he became "used to it pretty fast." 
(Tr., Vol. 1 , p.28, Ls.17-20.) Based on his testimony, it is clear that he is still able to 
determine the qualities of appearance, and thus, the sense of sight is not lost. (Opinion, 
pp.5-6.) 
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L.25.) However, Mr. Hight retained the use of his right eye, meaning he still had his 
sense of sight. Tr., Vol. 1 , L.17 (Mr. Hight testifying that he can still 
although he had to based on the impact to his depth perception).) As such, 
the prosecutor's statement that Mr. Hight had "lost his sense of sight" was blatantly 
wrong, and could only serve to appeal to the passions of the jury. 
The error, as discussed in Section II, infra, prejudiced Mr. Eddins. As such, all 
three elements of the Perry test are present and this Court should vacate Mr. Eddins' 
conviction based on the prosecutor's blatant misrepresentation of the facts in this case. 
IV. 
A. Introduction 
In order for a restitution award to be proper, it must be for damages actually and 
proximately caused by the defendant's culpable action. In this case, given the factual 
findings made by the jury, the only culpable action for which it could have convicted 
Mr. Eddins was making a threat. Since the threat-the words themselves-are 
incapable of causing physical injury, the restitution award for losses related to 
Mr. Hight's physical injury is erroneous. This Court should vacate the improper 
restitution award. 
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B. Based On The Jury's Findings Of Fact, Mr. Eddins Could Have Only, Rationally 
Been Convicted Of Aggravated Assault By Threat, And That Threat Cannot 
Be Said To Be The Actual Or Proximate Cause Of The Damages Awarded As 
Restitution In This Case 
Idaho courts are only authorized to award restitution for losses and injuries which 
are the result of the defendant's criminal conduct. I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(e)(i); 
State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing Hughey v. United States, 
495 U.S. 411, 420 (1990); see also State v. Schultz, 148 Idaho 884, 886-87 (Ct. App. 
2008); Shafer, 144 Idaho at 372; State v. Aubert, 119 Idaho 868,870 (Ct. App. 1991), 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Dorsey, 126 Idaho 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1995). 
"Criminal conduct" is limited to only those actions for which the defendant is found 
guilty. Shafer, 1 Idaho at 373 (upholding the decision to not award 
restitution because "no economic loss resulted from criminal act to which Shafer 
pleaded guilty"). It is also sometimes referred to as the "culpable act." Lampien, 148 
Idaho at 374. Therefore, Idaho law prohibits restitution for damages not caused by the 
defendant's culpable act. Shafer, 144 Idaho at 372 (citing I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)). 
To determine whether damages are caused by a culpable act, Idaho employs a 
tort law causation analysis. Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602; Lampien, 148 Idaho at 374; 
Nienbug, 153 Idaho at 495 ("Absent an agreement to the contrary, restitution may be 
ordered for an economic loss or injury only if there is a causal connection between the 
conduct for which the defendant was convicted and the loss the suffered by the victim"). 
Such causation analysis is more specific than that employed by the district court: "And I 
am going to order that restitution be paid because I think it clearly flows from the 
criminal conduct that Mr. Eddins was found guilty of." (Tr., Vo1.3, p.40, L.23 - p.41, L.1.) 
It also naturally follows from these rules that, if the defendant is determined to be not 
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guilty, the act alleged was not "criminal," since he is not culpable in committing that act. 
Cf. id.; Lampien, 1 Idaho at 374; 1 Idaho 373. 
Rather, the district court must be able to find that the particular event produced a 
particular consequence (actual cause) and whether the harm was reasonably 
foreseeable from the action and was not interrupted by an intervening, superseding 
cause (proximate cause). Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602. "Actual cause is a factual 
question of whether a particular event produced a particular consequence." 
Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 875 (2009) (quoting Newberry v. Martens, 142 Idaho 
284, 288 (2005». Similarly, "proximate cause is one of fact and almost always for the 
jury." Id. (quoting Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 61 (1980». Therefore, it is 
to know what facts the jury found in order to whether Mr. Eddins' 
culpable act actually and proximately caused the damage pursued in restitution. See id. 
The jury's findings of fact in this case are evident given the charges it considered 
and the verdict it returned. The jury was instructed, in regard to the aggravated battery 
charge, that the State was required to prove: (1) on or about July 11, 2010, (2) in 
the State of Idaho, (3) Mr. Eddins committed a battery upon Mr. Hight,11 (4) by striking 
Mr. Hight in the face with a plastic container containing a corrosive acid and/or caustic 
chemical, and (5) when doing so, Mr. Eddins used any vitriol, corrosive acid, or a 
caustic chemical of any nature. (R., p.263.) Contrarily, to commit aggravated assault, 
the jury was instructed that the State only had to prove: (1) on or about July 11, 2010, 
11 To commit the battery required by the third element, the jury was instructed that the 
State was required to prove that Mr. Eddins (1) willfully and unlawfully used force or 
violence upon the person of Mr. Hight, or (2) he actually, intentionally, and unlawfully 
touched or struck Mr. Hight against Mr. Hight's will, or (3) he unlawfully and intentionally 
caused bodily harm to Mr. Hight. (R., p.264.) 
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(2) in the State of Idaho, (3) Mr. Eddins committed an assault upon Mr. Hight,12 (4) with 
vitriol, corrosive acid, or caustic chemical of any kind. (R, ) 
The only difference between those two is the culpable To be guilty 
of battery, Mr. Eddins had to actually and intentionally strike Mr. Hight with acid, 
whereas, to be guilty of aggravated assault, he needed only to try to strike Mr. Hight 
with acid or threaten to strike Mr. Hight with acid. (Compare R, p.263 with R, p.266.) 
Additionally, the jury was instructed that it could not consider the aggravated assault 
charge without first acquitting Mr. Eddins on the aggravated battery charge. (R, p.265 
("If your unanimous verdict is that the defendant is not guilty of Aggravated battery, you 
must acquit him of that charge. In that event, you must next consider the included 
offense of Aggravated Assault.").) The jury is presumed to follow the jury instructions. 13 
State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713,718 (2011). 
The result, then, of the jury's verdict to acquit Mr. Eddins of the aggravated 
battery, but convict him of the aggravated assault, is that Mr. Eddins did not intend to 
strike Mr. Hight with the acid. (See R, p.251; compare R, p.263 with R, p.266.) 
Furthermore, it is nonsensical to say that this jury convicted Mr. Eddins on the assault 
by attempt theory because, if Mr. Eddins' attempt was criminal, it actually succeeded, 
and therefore, the jury (following the instructions not to compromise) would have 
12 To commit the assault identified in the third element, the jury was instructed that the 
State was required to prove Mr. Eddins either (1) unlawfully attempted, with the 
apparent ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another (i.e., assault-by-
attempt), or (2) he intentionally and unlawfully threatened by word or act to do violence 
to the person of Mr. Hight, with the apparent ability to do so, and does some act which 
creates a well-founded fear in the other person that such violence is imminent (i.e., 
assault by threat). (R., p.267.) 
13 As a result of the presumption that the jury follows the district court's instructions, it 
must also be presumed that the jury did not reach its verdict by compromise. (R., p.277 
("Your verdict in this case cannot be arrived at by chance, by lot, or by compromise.").) 
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convicted him of the competed action.14 It is not possible to find that a rational jury 
would convict on the assault by attempt theory when the attempt succeeds, especially 
where that same jury already acquitted the defendant in regard to the successful act. 
Compare State v. Broadhead, 139 Idaho 663, 665-66 (Ct. App. 2004) (defining attempt 
as "to make an effort to do, accomplish, solve or effect"). Therefore, the only act which 
the rational jury could deem culpable based on these factual findings is the assault by 
threat,15 However, such aggravated assaults are accomplished without actually causing 
physical injury. See, e.g., State v. Matthewson, 93 Idaho 769, 771-72 (1970) (finding 
that the defendant had committed aggravated assault when he made a threat while 
pointing a loaded gun at the victim). Therefore, the only culpable for which 
Mr. Eddins could possibly have been convicted was making a threat with the apparent 
ability to carry out that threat. 
That threat cannot be said to be the actual or proximate cause of Mr. Hight's 
physical injuries. Just because a person makes a threat does not mean that the threat 
will be followed by action. See Matthewson, 93 Idaho at 771-72. At most, the only thing 
that a threat can actually cause is fear in the other person. The threat-the words 
14 The only scenario based on these facts and jury findings that would allow for a 
conviction of assault by attempt after the acquittal of aggravated battery would be if 
Mr. Eddins had intentionally tried to throw the acid on Mr. Hight, but missed entirely. 
Since the acid actually hit Mr. Hight, the only rational conclusion is that the jury found 
Mr. Eddins did not try to get the acid on Mr. Hight. 
15 The assault by threat theory is, at least, potentially grounded in the evidence 
presented. Mr. Eddins testified that he told Mr. Hight to "back off, man, I have acid." 
(Tr., Vol. 1 , p.171 Ls.6-8; but see Tr., Vol. 1 , p.29, Ls.7-14 (Mr. Hight testifying that he did 
not hear Mr. Eddins make any such statement).) Mr. Eddins also had a bottle which 
contained acid. (See, e.g., Tr., Vol. 1 , p.130, Ls.11-20.) Therefore, the jury may have 
concluded that the statement "I have acid" constituted a threat, even though Mr. Hight 
did not hear it, and the fact that the bottle had acid in it gave Mr. Eddins the apparent 
ability to use that acid. (Compare R., p.267.) 
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themselves-did not cause the damage to Mr. Hight's eye, nor is it foreseeable that the 
words will capable of impacting the physical world. 16 Therefore, the losses 
with the treatment of Mr. Hight's were not actually or proximately caused 
by Mr. Eddins' culpable conduct, and thus, are not recoverable in restitution. I.C. § 19-
5304(1 )(e); Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602; Lampien, 148 Idaho at 374; Nienburg, 153 Idaho 
at 495. 
In that regard, this case, as discussed in Section 1(8), infra, is comparable to 
Shafer. In Shafer, the defendant pleaded guilty to leaving the scene of an accident. 
Shafer, 1 Idaho at 371. His vehicle had collided with another vehicle, resulting in 
severe injuries to the other driver. Id. It was not determined, nor was it to 
determine, who was for the accident, to support a finding that the defendant 
was guilty of the charged offense. Id. at 373. As such, restitution for those injuries was 
improper in that case. See id. at 373. The reason is that the crime of leaving the scene 
of the accident did not cause the other driver's injuries (i.e., that act was not the actual 
cause of the injuries). See id. Therefore, the Court of Appeals determined that the 
district court "did not have statutory authority to order Shafer to pay restitution for the 
losses the other driver suffered in the underlying motor vehicle accident, because those 
damages were not a result of the crime to which Shafer pleaded guilty." Id. at 373, 375. 
16 No matter what events could possibly flow from that culpable act, the causation is 
limited to what the culpable act itself can cause, not what mayor may not be somehow 
tangentially related to that act down the line. (See Opinion, p.13 (the dissent explaining 
that some intervening event must have occurred between the threat and the injury to 
cause the acid to splash on the two men, and implying that was the act from which 
causation must be determined).) 
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The Court of Appeals only upheld the restitution award because the defendant in 
case to pay restitution as a term of his plea agreement. 17 Jd. at 375. 
Similarly, as discussed in Section 1(8), supra, it cannot be said that, "but for 
Mr. Eddins's threat (the culpable act), Mr. Hight's eye would not have been injured." 
Therefore, since the threat, the only criminally culpable conduct, was not the actual, "but 
for" cause of the injury, the restitution statute does not authorize a restitution award for 
the injury. Compare Shafer, 150 Idaho at 602. 
As a result, since the conduct for which Mr. Eddins was convicted was not the 
legal cause of the injuries for which restitution was requested, the district court was not 
statutorily to 
eye culpable 
Mr. Eddins to pay restitution for the 
did not cause that injury.18 
CONCLUSION 
to Mr. Hight's 
Mr. Eddins respectfully requests that this Court grant review in this case. On 
review, he respectfully requests this Court vacate his conviction and remand his case 
for a new trial. Alternatively, he respectfully requests this Court vacate the improper 
restitution awards ordered by the district court 
DATED this 14th day of April, 2014. 
BRIAN R DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
17 Mr. Eddins has not made any such agreement. (See generally R) 
18 This Court has noted that such claims may still lie in a civil suit, but was adamant that 
"[t]he restitution statute was never meant to be a substitute for a civil action where the 
law is settled as to damages and the quantum of proof needed to prove those 
damages." Straub, 153 Idaho at 890. 
31 
I H CERTIFY that on April, 14, I served a true and 
copy of the foregoing IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR 
EW, by causing be placed a copy in the U Mail, addressed to: 
BRANDON TYLER EDDINS 
INMATE #74151 
ICC 
PO BOX 70010 
BOISE 1083707 
CARL B KERRICK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
RICHARD M CUDDIHY 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
LED BRI 
KENNETH K JORGENSEN 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
CRI INAL DIVISION 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE 10 83720~0010 
Hand deliver to Attorney General's mailbox at Supreme Court 
BRD/eas 
EVAN A. SMITH 
Administrative Assistant 
32 
